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Abstract: As an organic intellectual of the emerging propertied class in 17th 
century England, John Locke has made an enduring contribution to the 
prevailing ideas shaping the socio-political order in Western societies and 
beyond. Through invoking the law of nature and natural rights which were 
nothing more than what he had abstracted from the socio-economic 
conditions of the seventeenth century and had projected back into the state of 
nature, Locke assiduously embarked on justifying the separation of civil 
society from the state, naturalizing  class inequalities identifying the 
preservation of property as the fundamental function of the state, and 
rationalizing the subordination of  propertyless classes to the emerging  
liberal democratic political order geared to preserve the interests of 
economically hegemonic classes.  
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1. Introduction 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, England became the site of a profound alteration in 
social relations of production that heralded the looming of agrarian capitalism which in tum became a 
prelude to the gradual emergence of capitalist social relations in the eighteenth century. By the early 
decades of the seventeenth century, the gradual centralization of the state manifested in the emergence 
of the crown as the sole locus of legitimate power, the concentration of landed property and an 
unprecedented social dislodgement accompanied by the gradual extirpation of customary rights 
triggered waves of political turmoil in England. From the political ferment of the seventeenth century 
England, John Locke emerged as an intellectual weapon of the propertied class to embark on a 
theoretical campaign to alter prevailing politico-philosophical assumptions that had sustained 
absolutism [1]. In his assiduous attempt to launch a theoretical raid on the absolutist arguments, Locke 
simultaneously endeavoured to circumvent and curtail the democratic ramifications of his political 
theory that had been conducive to menacing the interests of the large propertied class. Through  
utilizing and extending the natural rights and the law of nature that he employed to counter 
absolutism, Locke theorized both the naturalization of class inequalities and the obligation of 
marginalized strata to political power that he had translated into a defensive mechanism to protect the 
social position of the emerging  hegemonic propertied and commercial class. 
This paper is divided into five parts. In part one, there is a brief discussion of methodologies. Part 
two deals with the development of agrarian capitalism and the rise of propertied class. Part three 
discusses Locke’s development of his political theory on transition from state of nature to civil 
society. Part four reflects of Locke’s attempt to naturalize class inequality. Part five discusses Locke’s 
utilization of his political theory to justify the subordination of propertyless class to political order 
geared to protect the interests of economically dominant class. Finally, main findings and enduring 
implications of Locke’s political theory for democracy will be highlighted in the concluding part of 
this paper.  
 
2. Mythological Notes 
Prior to analyzing Locke's utilization of his political theory to rationalize the interests of rising 
propertied and commercial classes, it is imperative to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of 
various methods of investigation that have been used to diagnose political ideas.  Within the domain 
of academic studies, there has been an inveterate contention over employing an appropriate mode of 
interpretation to dissect and analyze bequeathed political theories [2]. The philosophical and historical 
approaches are the two systematic procedures that are being resorted to as methods to evaluate 
promulgated political ideas by the past philosophers and political theoreticians [2]. Within the 
parameters of the philosophical approach, emphasis is excessively is placed on concepts, the logic of 
argumentation and the consistency of structured propositions. In contrast to ubiquity of the 
preponderant force of abstraction inscribed in the structure of the philosophical method, the historical 
approach is intended to situate bequeathed political ideas in a specific socio-political context [2]. It is 
crucial to note that resorting to a purely philosophical approach to study the theoretical legacies runs 
the risk of being susceptible to slip into the pitfall of abstraction which is bound to encounter a 
climate of controversy. Formulated political ideas by the past theoreticians and philosophers cannot 
be comprehended in abstraction independent of social, economic, and political forces of the time 
during which those ideas were developed. Social and political ideas of the past are not the relic of 
extraterrestrial collision that can be analyzed in abstraction. As Marx pointed out "the idea has always 
been a fiasco when divorced from interest." [3]. Social, economic, and political assumptions 
constructed by past thinkers were consciously formulated cognitive reactions to rationalize or impugn 
a specific set of social relations [4]. As Ellen and Neal, has suggested "political theory has been a 
historical legacy constructed in a specific historical context and responding to specific historical 
condition" [5]. It should be clarified that historicizing bequeathed political theory does not constitute 
an overweening rejection of theoreticians' contemplation on the past events or their projection of the 
future social order. Putting the political theory in a historical context only implies analyzing and 
relating the very constructed theory to a specific historical condition during which those ideas were 
formulated. 
It is therefore essential to dissect the political ideas of John Locke in the light of socio-economic 
shift in the seventeenth century which provided the basis for Locke to construct his political theory. 
More specifically, apprehending the political theory of Locke necessitates taking into consideration 
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Locke's social position within the social order in the seventeenth century, alteration in social class 
relations and the conflict between the crown and parliament that culminated in the "Glorious 
Revolution" of 1688.  Situating Locke in the historical condition of the seventeenth century England 
requires unraveling the underlying forces behind the political turmoil of the time during which Locke 
had emerged as an organic intellectual of the propertied classes [6]. 
 
3. The Rise of Propertied Class 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the centralization of the state and a specific pattern of 
agricultural production became the two significant politico-economic developments in England [5]. In 
contrast to the continental Europe particularly France where  the dissemination of politico-judicial 
jurisdictions had remained  intact  as the striking  feature of the feudal order, by 1600, in England,  the 
centripetal tendencies had led to the consolidation of the state power in a unified  entity [5]. The seeds 
for the gravitation of the fragmented politico- judicial powers towards the centre were sown by the 
Norman Conquest that had brought to England a class of rulers already organized in a cohesive 
politico-military unit [7].   
The centralization of the state in England was further strengthened through the nationalization of 
the common law and the emergence of a national church subjugated to and sustaining the unified 
state. The subordination of the church to the supremacy of the crown culminated in the neutralization 
of a significant locus of power within the state which in turn provided an ideological ammunition for 
the centralizing project had had been set in motion under the reign of Tudor-monarchs [5]. The 
consolidation of fragmented administrative and legal jurisdictions in a unified institution of the state 
was accompanied by a gradual removal of the extra-economic powers at the disposal of the landed 
class to appropriate surplus labor. The eclipse of non-economic measures from the process of surplus 
labor appropriation was not equivalent to the dispossession of landed class from its leverages over the 
social relations of production. Despite the depersonalization of the politico-judicial power, the landed 
aristocracy continued to exercise its domination through property ownership which contained a purely 
economic power [5].  As Wood has pointed out, the removal of extra-economic powers from the 
realm of surplus labour expropriation and the reliance of the dominant class on the mere economic 
power to extract surplus labour was a process conducive to "the privatization of the political power" 
[8].  Subsequent to this politically expedient shift in the means of surplus labor expropriation, landed 
aristocrats came to be directly dependent on rent that they acquired from tenant farmers who under the 
intensified force of competition began to operate as capitalists [9]. The direct dependence of the 
landed aristocrats on the rent and the growing proclivity of tenant farmers to increase their profits led 
to the confluence of interest between producers and appropriators to improve productivity through 
technological innovations which heralded the emergence of the agrarian capitalism in England [10]. 
Alteration in the means of surplus labor appropriation and the convergence of interests between tenant 
producers and appropriators led to the recasting of social relations of classes along the triad of 
landlords, tenant farmers and wage earners [11]. The gradual shift from the feudal social relations of 
production to agrarian capitalism did not constitute a threat to the social location of the landed 
aristocrats within the social order because they continued to receive an increased rent that ensued 
competition and technological innovations in agricultural production [8].  More specifically, the 
gradual development of agrarian capitalism that began to loom in the sixteenth century implied an 
internal restructuring of the landed aristocracy without being disarmed from its economic power. As 
Robert Brenner (1978) has meticulously elucidated, it was the self-transformation of the landed 
aristocracy that manifested itself in a decisive shift from feudalism to agrarian capitalism which 
became a prelude to the swaying motion of capitalist social relations [9]. 
It should be noted that the separation of extra-economic powers from private appropriation did not 
imply that politico-judicial measures were not indirectly employed by the ruling class to consolidate 
its position within the social order and tighten its grip of power over social relations of production. 
Despite this alteration in social relations along the capitalist lines which E.P Thompson (1991) has 
characterized as the "predatory phase of agrarian capitalism", land continued to remain as the 
"jumping off point for power and office, and the point to which power and office returned" [12]. In 
spite of this ostensible disentanglement of the extra-economic powers from surplus labor 
appropriation, it was through the institutions of the state that the propertied class invoked common 
law and parliamentary measures to trigger waves of enclosure which decisively shifted the balance of 
power to an already powerful ruling aristocracy [12].         
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It was thus through political and judicial means that customary rights of peasants were extirpated, 
and the poor were destined to "became estrangers in their own land" [12]. As Karl Polanyi (1944) 
meticulously pointed out, enclosures that engender a climate of perplexity for the marginalized strata, 
was "a revolution of the rich against the poor" [13]. The eclipse of customary practices from the realm 
of social relations of production and the exposure of smallholders to the force of market competition 
gradually generated compelling momentum to propel the vast majority of peasants towards the 
blackhole of wage earning labor [11] [12]. Even though the depersonalization of extra-economic 
power accompanied by the centralization of the state did not pose a threat to private appropriation, the 
monopolization of the legitimate use of force by the centralized state allowed the crown to emerge as 
the only legitimate and authoritative source of governance that created a condition within which the 
ruling class could only preserve its interests through state institutions [9]. The concentration of 
political power in the hands of the crown which was equivalent to the neutralization of disseminated 
centers of non- economic powers, generated a structural paradox for the ruling class because of the 
degree of autonomy that the crown had acquired. It was due to the persistent quest of the propertied 
classes to control and limit the power of the state that England became the scene of political 
confrontation between parliament and the crown which ultimately culminated in the "Glorious 
Revolution" of 1688.  Even though it is beyond the scope of this paper to exhaustively explicate the 
forces behind the Civil War of the seventeenth century, it is sufficient to state that the fundamental 
aim of the parliamentary front was to circumscribe the power of the crown and subjugate it to the will 
of the parliament which had functioned as the national protector of the propertied classes. Despite the 
religious colouration of the Civil War, the forces that intensified the political conflict had in fact 
emanated from the discord within the ruling class [14]. In order to elicit concession and frighten the 
crown into submission, the radical members of the ruling class countenanced and utilized the growing 
social resentment within the lower layers of the social order. On the other hands, the conservative 
members of the hegemonic class were anxious with growing involvement of the masses in the affairs 
of the state which in their view had the potential to undermine the long-term interest of the ruling 
class. Due to their preoccupation with the political mobilization of the lower strata, the conservative 
members of the ruling aristocracy inclined to crawl into the bosom of the king [14]. It was thus due to 
the  differences within  the dominant  class that the Civil  War was initiated  and consequently 
culminated in the triumph  of the parliamentary camp without the fulfillment of democratic demands 
that had been aspired  by the  marginalized classes. 
 
4. Locke’s Development of His Political Theory  
As explicated earlier, it is in the light of the socio-economic shift of the seventeenth century England 
and the political confrontation between the crown and parliament that the underlying interests beneath 
the political theory of Locke can be comprehensively unravelled. Locke, who had descended  from a 
family  at the periphery of the lesser gentry, came into contact  with Anthony  Ashely Cooper, the first 
Earl of Shaftesbury, who had emerged as the most overpowering and astute political figure in the 
seventeenth century England [15].  The first Earl of Shaftesbury was a wealthy capitalist landowner 
who was also an active figure in colonial trade and investment. Shaftesbury was known for his 
political dexterity and opportunistic maneuverability that he manifested through his shift of allegiance 
from the royalist to the parliamentary camp [16]. During the political campaign projected to prevent 
the accession of James 11 to the throne which came to be characterized as the "Exclusion Crisis" of 
1679-81, the first Earl of Shaftesbury acted as the main architect to instigate and countenance an 
alliance between the parliamentary Whigs and popular radicals [5]. In his surreptitious activities to 
rally the forces against the crown, the first Earl of Shaftesbury engaged in a close political 
deliberation with John Locke [17]. Due to the degree of confidence that he had acquired within the 
circle of Shaftesbury's family, Locke clandestinely acted as an "assistant pen" and "ideologist in 
residence" to his master [18]. The secret political consultation and exchange of views between Locke 
and the Shaftesbury, and latter's encouragement of the former to tum his intellectual attention to the 
political affairs of the state was conspicuously revealed by the first Earl's grandson. 
Mr. Locke grew so much in esteem with my grandfather that, as great a man as he had experienced 
him in physic, he looked upon this but as his least part. He encouraged him to tum his thoughts 
another way... He put him upon the study of religious and civil affairs of the nation. He entrusted him 
with his secretes negotiations, and made use of his assistant pen in matters that nearly concerned the 
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state, and were fit to be made public, to raise that spirit in the nation which was necessary against the 
prevailing Popish party [15].  
 Until 1667, during which a tenacious association was developed between Locke and the first Earl 
of Shaftesbury, Locke had exclusively concentrated his intellectual energy on moral philosophy and 
the study of medicine [19]. It was under the tutelage of his patron that Locke shifted his interests to 
political theory which was  intended to justify the limitation on the power of the crown and 
simultaneously  legitimize the supremacy of parliament that were congruent with Shaftesbury's 
publicly promulgated political position [16]. To enervate the position of the crown and subordinate 
the power of the state to parliament, Locke was required to reinterpret the prevailing philosophical, 
economic and political assumptions which in tum necessitated him to counter and impugn two lines of 
absolutist argument that had been conducive to countenancing the omnipotent power of the king. The 
first line of absolutist interpretation that had been handed down from the Middle Ages was the divine 
rights of kings which characterized kings not only as the shadow of the God but also as God's 
representatives on the earth. During a speech before parliament in 1610, James 1 of England 
conspicuously invoked this theory by enunciating that" kings are not only God's  lieutenants upon 
earth and sit down upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are called gods" [20]. Locke had 
to confront this patriarchal theory of divine rights of kings that was forcibly elaborated by Sir Robert 
Filmer, who asserted that kings are and should be conceived as beings the direct heirs to Adam [21].  
It was Filmers's patriarchal argument that the final determination of political question cannot be left to 
the individual members of society and that there is no sovereign unless the king who is the source of 
laws, would stand above the laws [21] [22]. The second line of argument in the support of absolutism 
that Locke had to tackle had been formulated by Thomas Hobbes. Unlike Filmer who had grounded 
his theoretical justification for the full sway of monarchial absolutism on biblical accounts of 
"fatherhood and property", Hobbes had rested his theoretical argument for absolutism on human 
nature and the rational calculation of individuals to yield to the yoke of an absolute sovereign who can 
provide a secure environment within which individuals could pursue their activities [5].  Hobbes’s 
preoccupation with the exigency of stability and social order had persuaded him to call for a self-
perpetuating sovereign to whom individuals would surrender their individual rights in return for a 
collective order. Hobbes assumed that rational and egoistic individuals are constantly driven by an 
urge for personal gratification which is bound to position each individual in a constant state of war 
with others. It was Hobbes's conviction that in the absence of an absolute sovereign who could 
restrain the competitive pressures among individuals, anarchy would prevail, and the social fabric of 
society would be born asunder [5] [18]. 
   In his intellectual endeavour to refute and undermine the philosophical and theological 
arguments that had been deployed to sustain absolutism, Locke confronted Filmer in his First Treatise 
and reformulate his line of attack in the Second Treatise which without any specification was directed 
at the argument that Hobbes had constructed in Leviathan [15]. Based on his interpretation of the 
Scriptures, Locke asserted that no comprehensive theory of obligation to the king can be extracted 
from the premises upon which Filmer had rested his Patriarchal theory of divine rights of king [16] 
[21]. Contrary to Filmer’s general argument that the absolute exercise of political power by the kings 
was an inherent right which emanated from the power that God had granted to Adam, Locke 
maintained that there was no textual warrant that could corroborate the transfer of such power to 
anyone else: 
If God by his positive grant and revealed declaration, first gave rule and dominion to any man, he 
that will claim by that title, must have the same positive grant of God for his succession. For if that 
has not directed the course of its descent and conveyance down to others, nobody can succeed to this 
title of the first ruler [16].  
To theorize the limitation on the exercise of political power by the state and therefore undermine 
the philosophical and theological edifice upon which the arguments for absolutism were rested, Lock 
like Hobbes, grounded his theoretical explanation on natural rights and the law of nature. Unlike 
Hobbes, who had depicted a chaotic and frightening picture of the state of nature which in his view 
necessitated the presence of a powerful sovereign with absolute authority to restrain inevitable 
contention and pugnacity among individuals, Locke inclined to provide a peaceful scene of the state 
of nature. Like Hobbes, Locke sketched the natural condition of mankind not in an historical 
condition existing before the emergence of political society but as a logical deduction from the 
essential nature of man and the purpose of creation [23].  
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In his second Treatise of Government which marked the separation of civil society from the state 
that has continued to be the striking dimension of the capitalist social order, Locke theorized the 
transition of civil society in the state of nature to political society.  Locke maintained that in the state 
of nature, individuals have inalienable natural rights to "life, liberty and estate" which are the gifts of 
nature bestowed by the omnipotent God [24]. Locke illustrated the state of nature as "the state of 
perfect freedom" within which individuals without being subjugated to the dictates of others have 
natural rights within the bound of the natural law to "dispose of their possession, as they think 
fit."[23]. On the basis of his interpretation of natural law and Scriptures, Locke deducted the ubiquity 
of the principle of equality in the state of nature. Locke asserted that the earth and its fruits were 
originally given by God to mankind in common and that there is a natural equality for all individuals 
to enjoy what they have received from their creator [25]. According to Locke, the prevalence of 
equality in the state of nature emanated from the natural limitations on individual acquisition. First, 
everyone can appropriate only as much as he can leave "enough" for others [18]. Second, 
appropriation must be proportional to self-reproduction and any amount beyond that would constitute 
spoilage and the destruction of the fruits of earth [18]. Third, the rightful appropriation is limited to 
the amount that an individual could procure with his own labor [25]. Locke conspicuously 
emphasized the prevalence of the state of equality among individuals in the state of nature within 
which "all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another" [23]. Locke did not 
equate the state of nature with the state of anarchy because in his view individuals are bound by the 
duty to God and governed by the law of nature. According to Locke, individuals can discern the law 
of nature through their rationality which would propel them to respect each other and eschew 
infringing upon one another's liberty [24] [26]. While Locke asserted that individuals are generally 
reasonable enough to inflict on themselves individually the necessary moral codes to stifle their 
contentious appetites, he simultaneously declared that natural rights in the state of nature are 
susceptible to encroachment. Thus, in parallel to Hobbes's depiction of the state of nature as the 
terrain of warfare, Locke inclined to concede the inevitability of bellicose confrontation among 
individuals that he attributed to the "inconveniences" in the state of nature [24]. Even though Locke 
assiduously strove to depict a peaceful picture of the state of nature, he also maintained that when the 
enforcement of law is left to individuals, there would be many judges and hence ensuing conflictual 
interpretations of the law of nature. It was Locke’s conviction that in the presence of these 
inconveniences and in the absence of" a common superior to appeal", the state of nature is bound to 
culminate in "the state of war".  According to Locke, it is to prevent the transition of civil society in 
the state of nature to the state of war that individuals leave the state of nature and form a political 
society: 
To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein the least 
difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great 
reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quieting the state of nature [23]. 
What is conspicuous from Locke's characterization of the transition from the state of nature to 
political society is that civil society does precede the establishment of political society or state and 
that the latter is solely created to surmount conflictual interpretations of the law of nature which 
prevail in the state of nature. In other words, the absence of political authority in the state of nature 
that could regulate the exercise of natural rights and punish violators is the fundamental force behind 
the natural predilection of "equally free men" to construct a political order [24]. More specifically, 
Locke envisaged the formation of the state as "a proper remedy to the inconveniences of the state of 
nature" [23]. It should be emphasized that the creation of a political authority within Locke's 
theoretical framework does not signal the transfer of all individual's right to the state.  Even though 
within the paradigm of Locke's theoretical analysis the authority of law making and the power of its 
enforcement are ceded to the state, the whole process is contingent upon the adherence of the state to 
its essential purpose which is the preservation of life, liberty and estate [27].  Since within Locke's 
theoretical justification of the transition to political society natural rights are prior to the establishment 
of the state, these rights cannot be circumvented or restricted without the consent of those possessing 
them. The state is thus born out of an agreement among individuals and the consent will be withdrawn 
whenever government fails to provide an auspicious atmosphere within which people can enjoy their 
natural rights. Thus, in a sharp contrast to Hobbes’s notion of the subordination of individuals to an 
absolute sovereign without their involvement in political processes, Locke located the locus of 
ultimate sovereignty in people [24]. Even though Locke endeavoured to resuscitate and restate the 
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ancient political ideas of government as a political entity which emanates from community and is 
subjugated to the laws authorized by citizens, he eschewed explicating direct democracy as a 
mechanism to administer political society. Despite this conspicuous deficiency that ran counter  to his 
attempt  to revive the traditional political  ideas, Locke's initial characterization of the transition  of 
the state of nature to political community was bound to theorize  society  as a community of equals  
where no individual  is permitted  to live at the expense of others. It would not be a far-fetched claim 
to suggest that had Locke refrained from extending his Second Treatise beyond the third chapter, he 
would have gone down in the history of political thought as a prominent socialist theoretician. 
Locke's initial  assumptions of the earth as a gift of God, natural restrictions on individual 
appropriation and the absence of power differentiation were not only conducive to fulfilling the 
demands of Levellers  but were also geared to legitimize the radical aspirations of Diggers  who had 
launched  a political  campaign for the communality of property : 
The beginning of Locke's Second  Treatise  of Government sounds  almost as if it has been written  
by Winstanley and his discussions of property begins  with something  very like Winstanley's 
assertion  that God gave the earth to humankind to be a common property [5].  
Had Locke inclined  to restrict his theoretical explanation of the transition from the state of nature 
to political  society within  the first three chapters  of the Second  Treatise of Government, he would 
not have only become  an intellectual weapon of the popular masses but he would have also provided  
an intellectual momentum to reinforce  the radical demands of Levellers  which were bound  to 
threaten the domination of the large propertied class. The radical aspirations of Levellers which 
reflected the interests of small independent proprietors were conducive to menacing the predominant 
position of the ruling propertied class within social relations of production. Even though Levellers had 
not projected their struggle to put an end to the institution of private property, they strenuously 
deprecated enclosures and the eradication of customary rights which were bound to precipitate the 
concentration of property in a few hands [5] [25]. Levellers were outrightly opposed to the association 
of privileges and political rights with large property which was an egregious pattern of politics in the 
seventeenth century England. In their struggle to curtail the concentration of land, Levellers advocated 
the reassertion of liberty for small men to acquire property and identified the power of accumulation 
by privileges as a real threat to both liberty and property [8]. Furthermore, on the contention of the 
boundaries of suffrage which reached to its apogee in Putney Debates, Levellers persistently 
endeavoured to extend franchise beyond the parameters delineated by the ruling class. Despite their 
adherence to the institution of private property, Levellers' call for religious freedom and the extension 
of franchise was construed by the ruling propertied class as a propagation for anarchy.  Even though 
Levellers had adopted an ambiguous stance on the scope of franchise and were oscillating on their 
radical demands, they nonetheless held the conviction that no free man can be subjugated to political 
power without his consent [28]. In a sharp contrast to Ireton and Cromwell who during the Putney 
Debate vehemently strove to confine suffrage to free holders, Rainsborough, as a spokesperson for 
Levellers, unequivocally stated that" the poorest he has a life to live, he also possesses the right not to 
be governed except by his own consent" [5]. the overriding force behind the radical demands of 
Levellers to extend suffrage laws was a strong conviction that not government or parliament but 
“people as popular multitude were sovereign" [5]. In other words, Levellers had intended to replace 
the emphasis on the supremacy of parliament with the power of people as a mechanism to regulate the 
social order. Levellers' remonstration with the eclipse of customary practices from the realm of social 
relations and their call for the supersession of parliamentary supremacy by the power of people 
constituted a direct threat to the domination of the large propertied class to which Locke had 
committed himself to defend and rationalize its interests. 
 
5. Justification of Class Inequality 
In order to curtail the democratic aspirations of popular radicals and therefore preserve the interests of 
the ruling class, Locke had to circumvent and tarnish the democratic corollaries of his theoretical 
argument against absolutism. Deflecting the democratic menace impended on the hegemonic position 
of the large propertied class and anchoring its position within social order necessitated Locke to 
justify both class inequalities and the political obligation of propertyless strata to the rules of political 
society. The justification of social class inequalities emanated from unlimited individual acquisition 
required Locke to restructure his postulated natural restrictions on individual appropriation in the state 
of nature. As explicated earlier, in the beginning of his Second Treatise of Government, Locke 
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theorized natural limitations on wealth accumulation which had accordingly secured the equality of 
power among individuals in the state of nature. The extension of natural limitations on individual 
appropriation to unlimited individual acquisition was sine qua non for the rationalization of class 
inequalities that Locke had to justify. According to Locke, the invention of money in the state of 
nature not only rendered natural limitations inoperative but it also triggered the trends towards 
unequal holing [2] [18] [23]. It was Locke's theorization that the introduction of money as both the 
medium of exchange and as the stored wealth provided the possibility for individuals to enlarge their 
possession without violating the spoilage limitation [2]. In other words, money permitted individuals 
to convert any amount of perishable goods into money which could not be spoiled. Furthermore, the 
extension of commerce as a corollary of the usage of money made it profitable for individuals to 
appropriate more land and therefore leaving none for others [23].  On two interrelated grounds, Locke 
justified the concentration of land in few hands. First, Locke postulated that in the state of nature all 
individuals had consented to the introduction of money which has had the potential to facilitate the 
concentration of land [18]. Second, Locke attributed improvement to private ownership which he 
theorized as an impetus to make privately owned land more productive than the land held in common 
[2] [25]. As Macpherson has pointed out, it was Locke's assumption that the productivity ensued 
private appropriation of the land would offset the lack of availability of land for others because living 
condition of all would be much better under private appropriation than under condition of holing land 
in common [25]. Locke's notion of improvement echoed the voice of large property holders and 
agricultural reformers in the seventeenth century England for whom “God’s injection in genesis was a 
favorite justification in their call for enclosure and utilization of waste land" [2].  In other words, 
Lock’s enormous accentuation on improvement and the alleged economic inefficiency of uncultivated 
land corroborated the crusade for enclosure and the removal of customary laws that had been waged 
by the landowning class in the seventeenth century England. It is also crucial to note that Locke's 
exaltation of improvement provided an ideological justification to encourage and legitimize colonial 
expansionism in North America which consequently culminated in the dispossession of the Indians 
from their hunting grounds [29]. Furthermore, as Birdal [30] has pointed out, though Locke developed 
his political theory during pre-industrial revolution, his philosophical discussion of property and 
natural rights dominated the political thought of nineteenth century liberal thinkers who rested   their 
interpretation of new form of property under the emerging capitalist mode of production. In line with 
his justification of class inequality, Locke also provided a rational justification for propertyless class’s 
subjugation to the rules of liberal state.  
 
6. Justifying Political Obligation 
Within Locke's theoretical interpretation, it is conspicuous that the introduction of money has also 
transcended the rightful appropriation limited to what an individual could procure through his own 
labour. Accordingly, the appropriation of land facilitated by the usage of money would leave many 
individuals without property who are required to sell their labour for wages in order to survive [2]. 
Tully [31] has argued that Locke did not relegate labour to the status a commodity that can be sold on 
the market. Contrary to Tully's assertion that the alienability of labour had no place in Locke's 
theoretical vocabulary, Locke conceptualized labor as a commodity that can be sold and its produce 
could in tum be appropriated by the buyer [2] [25].  Despite the logical plausibility of his theorization 
of the appropriation of the labor of others which contradicted his original notion of the equality of 
power relations in the state of nature, Locke conspicuously eschewed unraveling the explicit coercion 
inscribed in the structure of free wage contracts. In the absence of land and capital upon which labor 
could be projected, propertyless individuals would have no choice except subjugating to the yoke of 
voluntary contracts through which the produces of their labor would be appropriated by buyers [25]. 
Subsequent to his attempt to naturalize socio-economic inequalities that he imputed to the tacit 
consent of individuals to both the usage of money and accepting its consequences, Locke endeavoured 
to justify the political obligation of the propertyless classes to the rules of governmental authority. 
Locke’s attempt to identify propertyless class as an object of the state policy can be discerned from 
his hypothetically constructed social contract and his ambiguous notion of consent.  It is suggested 
that Locke’s social contract involves two consecutive stages of the formation of civil society and a 
subsequent establishment of the common superior [32]. In the first stage, Locke’s formulated 
inconveniences which are nothing more than conflicts emanating from unequal socio-economic 
relations that have allegedly compelled individuals to voluntarily leave the state of nature behind, 
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enter political society and commit themselves to a bond of political obligation [27]. What can be 
comprehended from Locke's first stage of social contract is that individuals have unanimously 
endorsed the patterns of unequal distribution of power relations. But Locke did not elucidate why 
there should be a confluence of interest between propertied and propertyless individuals to commit 
themselves to a bond of political obligation which has sustained the domination of the former over the 
latter? The first stage is a prelude to the second stage within which individuals choose their 
representatives and cede their power to the legislative branch which is mandated to preserve the ends 
of civil society.  Locke’s differentiation of these stages was designed to theorize that the locus of 
power lies in civil society and that the essential task of government is to preserve property [33]. It is 
within the context of the second stage of social contract that Locke’s binary interpretation of consent 
can be vividly construed as an overt attempt to justify the political obligation of non- franchised strata 
to the laws of the state that was prevalent in the seventeenth century England. To Locke, political 
obligation emanated from either express consent reflected through voting and taking an oath to abide 
to the authority of the state or tacit consent which implied an unspoken agreement to obey the laws of 
political authority by non- franchised individuals who have voluntarily remained within the territorial 
jurisdiction of a given state   Locke's depiction of consent along the axis of express and tacit reflected 
the political reality of the seventeenth century England during which voting and political rights were 
confined to the propertied classes whereas the propertyless layers of the social order had been 
ostracized [2] [25]. Ashcraft [16] has impugned the identification of express and tacit consent with the 
propertied and propertyless classes because in his view there is no class differentiation contained in 
Locke’s concept of tacit consent. But as Wood [2] has pointed out, nothing can be extrapolated from 
Locke' political theory that would have gone beyond the Whig's obstinate stance to eschew endorsing 
the vertical extension of franchise in the seventeenth century England (pp. 83-85).  Locke's 
justification of political obligation and his judicial conceptualization of the state as an "umpire" to 
maintain the natural rights were conducive to preserve and consolidate the interests of the propertied 
class within the institutions of the state [25]. The radical departure of Locke from the classical 
conception of democracy and his overt attempt to secure the domination of the ruling propertied class 
has been meticulously elucidated by Wood [2]. 
His [Locke's] egalitarianism, nevertheless, might be described as bourgeois egalitarianism, a 
mentality - in opposition to the traditional aristocratic Weltanschauung- that came to typify the 
outlook of many capitalist and would be capitalists. .although he described human inequality to 
differences in education and social environment, he accepted as desirable those differences and social 
division of labor and property differentiation that produced inequality his attitude was very much in 
keeping with the typical bourgeois egalitarianism that attached the dominance of aristocratic 
birth...but had no intention of undermining the sovereignty of the propertied classes in general over 
the laboring poor. Locke therefore was by no stretch of the imagination a democrat [2]. 
 
7. Conclusion 
As has been demonstrated throughout this paper, apprehending the political ideas of Locke, and 
unraveling the underlying motives beneath the edifice of his political theory necessitate taking into 
consideration the historical condition of the seventeenth century England during which Locke 
formulated his politico-philosophical assumptions. The centralization of the state accompanied by the 
gradual removal of the extra-economic powers at the disposal of the propertied classes as means of 
surplus expropriation that led the emergence of the crown as the sole locus of the legitimate center of 
governance, engendered a climate of consternation for the propertied class which controlled the 
parliamentary branch of the state. The preoccupation of landowning class with the accumulation of 
power in the hands of the crown and its incessant attempts to employ parliament as an institutional 
means to curtail the power of the king led to a political conflict between the two camps which 
ultimately culminated in the triumph of the parliamentary side and the emergence of parliament as the 
supreme branch of the state. It was within the context of the political turbulence of the seventeenth 
century England that Locke emerged as an intellectual weapon of agrarian capitalism. In his 
commitment to justify the supremacy of parliament and anchor the hegemonic position of the 
propertied class within the social order, Locke launched a theoretical campaign to alter the traditional 
and philosophical assumptions prevalent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries England. In his 
assiduous endeavours to preserve and consolidate the interests of the propertied class, Locke not only 
countered absolutist arguments but he also circumvented the democratic ramifications of his political 
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theory. Through invoking the law of nature and natural rights which were nothing more than what he 
had abstracted from the socio-economic conditions of the seventeenth century and had projected back 
into the state of nature, Locke endeavoured to justify the separation of civil society from the state, 
naturalize class inequalities and identify the preservation of property as the fundamental function of 
the state. By embarking on the extension of the state of equality in the state of nature to unlimited 
appropriation and his subsequent attempt to subjugate the propertyless strata as an object of the state 
policy, Locke neutralized the democratic corollaries of his radical political ideas. Despite his 
theoretical assaults on absolutism and his glorification of liberty, Locke’s ideas which formed the 
basis for eighteenth and nineteenth century classical liberal theorists, circumvented the classical 
conception of democracy and superseded it by the bourgeois notion of democracy that has continued 
to remain as a striking and controversial dimension of capitalist societies. Locke laid the foundation 
for the development of liberalism which despite its fusion with democracy reflected through the 
gradual adoption of universal suffrage, has remained faithful to Locke's political theory. The 
congruity of liberal democracy with Locke’s theoretical postulates can be comprehended from 
former’s elevation of private property to the status of a sacrosanct law and its inveterate stance to 
fortify the economic sphere from being permeated with democratic norms. Locke might have been 
successful in resorting to casuistic and desultory arguments to justify social class inequalities, but he 
also sowed the theoretical seeds of contradiction for liberalism which has manifested itself through 
the irreconcilability of liberty and equality in a class -based society that Locke sedulously 
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